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Trust-building creates puzzles for analysts in relation to what kind of trust is built
in world politics, between whom, and to what end. This article studies two types
of trust in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: rationalist trust which
characterizes inter-state cooperation to protect order and cosmopolitan trust which
reveals the emancipatory potential of political structures that aim to achieve more
security for individuals. In this study, two types of trust will be illustrated in the
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation by analyzing the link between security and trust.
It is argued that while rationalist trust between states with ‘security as order’
rationality reconstructs the status quo in North African countries, cosmopolitan
trust with ‘security as emancipation’ rationality toward North African individuals
has the potential to transform these countries’ political structures.
Keywords: security; trust; Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; emancipation;
cosmopolitanism
The contribution
This article studies two types of trust in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: rational-
ist trust which characterizes inter-state cooperation to protect order and cosmopolitan
trust which reveals the emancipatory potential of political structures that aim to
achieve more security for individuals. Through the analysis, the article aims to
contribute to the developing literature on trust in world politics and critical approaches
to security. It also aims to provide an alternative perspective for scholars to study the
Euro-Mediterranean relationship.
1. Introduction
This article is built on the assumption that trust is functional to constructing particular
political structures in world politics, depending on the security rationalities of the
actors among whom trust is built. By focusing on the EU–North African states rela-
tionship in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), it aims to
answer the following question: what patterns of trust-building doing the analysis of
the EMP reveal when studied through competing security rationalities of the EU in
relation to North Africa? The main argument is that the EMP is characterized and can
be explained by two types of trust. Rationalist trust between the EU and North African
states reconstructs the status quo, and the authoritarian regimes in North Africa are left
*Email: abilgic@bilkent.edu.tr
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458  A. Bilgic 
largely unchallenged by the EU. In contrast, cosmopolitan trust of the EU’s decision-
makers toward North African civil society actors can transform these countries’ polit-
ical structures1 by, first, challenging authoritarianism through EU policies and,
second, by integrating civil society actors into the partnership’s decision-shaping and
-making.
The argument will be elaborated in two sections. In the theoretical section, it will
be argued that trust in world politics can become both a tool for the preservation of
the status quo and a source of transformation, depending on the security rationalities
of the actors involved in the trust-building process. First, the different definitions of
trust will be introduced in order to clarify what ‘trust’ means in this study. Hence,
rationalist and cosmopolitan trust in world politics will be situated within the wider
literature about trust. In addition, the theoretical section, by bringing two different
understandings of security in International Relations (IR) into the discussion, aims to
explore the security rationalities, which can facilitate the two types of trust-building.
In the empirical section, rationalist and cosmopolitan trust will be illustrated
within the EMP. The questions the empirical section seeks to answer are what insecu-
rities does the EU perceive in the southern neighborhood? How has the EU been deal-
ing with these insecurities through trust-building? Does trust-building produce
security and, if yes, for whom? First, the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation based on
rationalist trust will be problematized with specific reference to two issues: the failure
of the partnership to promote democracy in southern Mediterranean countries and the
marginalization of civil society in the EMP by the dominant pro-status quo states.
Second, the political relationships enabled by cosmopolitan trust will be discussed,
namely the European Union’s emancipatory policies, which challenge authoritarian
states and strengthen wider civil society participation in the EMP. It will be argued
that the EU, by adopting emancipation as the norm of security rationality and tran-
scending its fears about the uncertain consequences of political reforms, can offer
cosmopolitan trust to North African individuals. Therefore, the EU can generate polit-
ical transformation in North Africa.
2. Rationalist trust and cosmopolitan trust
Trust has remained an under-theorized concept in the discipline of IR, although it has
been conceptualized in different ways in sociology, psychology, and political
science.2 It is not possible to find an agreed definition of trust in the academic litera-
ture. One approach defines trust as the character of a relationship which serves the
interests of both trusting and trustee parties (Hardin 2001; Kohn 2008). It is a conse-
quence of rational calculation (Dees 2004, 34). This approach has been adopted by
several scholars of IR, as will be discussed below. Another approach, while not
completely neglecting the role of interest, conceptualizes trust by focusing on its
normative side: the belief that the trustee will ‘do the right thing’ because of love,
compassion, empathy, and optimism engendered between human beings. Hollis
(1998) calls it ‘normative trust’, Hoffman (2005) ‘fiduciary trust’, and Lewis and
Weigart (1985) ‘emotional trust’. Some approaches emphasize the risky character of
trust by identifying it as ‘betting’ (Sztompka 1999). Moreover, some analysts argue
that trust can be developed between individuals who share certain cultural/communi-
tarian characteristics (Soraka, Banting, and Johnston 2002). Others argue that this is
not necessarily the case (Uslaner 2002). Differences in the literature about trust are
important indicators of how trust can be built differently in world politics. In relation
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 459
to trust in politics, the meaning of trust changes depending on the political actors, their
values and interests, and their political agendas.
2.1. Rationalist trust and the preservation of the status quo
As Luhmann states (1988, 103), any system, be it political, economic, or legal, oper-
ates through trust because without trust, ‘it cannot stimulate supportive activities in
situations of uncertainty and risk’. In the international system, actors do not fully
interact under the condition of uncertainty, contrary, for example, to what offensive
realists would argue. The character of the relationships in ‘mature anarchy’ is more
cooperative than that in ‘immature anarchy’ (Buzan 1991; Smith 1991). Hobbesian,
Lockian, and Kantian anarchies are constructed through different ways of interaction
among states (Wendt 1999). In other words, some students of IR have acknowledged
that the realm of world politics is not fully characterized by mistrust and fear, but there
are possibilities of constructing and conducting more positive relationships on the
basis of trust. However, questions about what kind of trust can be conceived, between
whom, and to what end remain unanswered.
Trust in the discipline of IR is generally understood as a means to achieve partic-
ular ends. Therefore, it is conceived as a tool which serves the interests of rational
actors – primarily states. While the normative side of trust is overlooked, the concept
of interest lies at the heart of this type of understanding of trust. Russell Hardin (2001,
3) defines trust in relation to interest, by arguing that maintaining the trust relationship
depends on the actors’ interests in it. Actors choose to be trustworthy as long as the
trust relationship serves their interests.
Initial theorizing of trust in IR was conducted within the Prisoner Dilemma frame-
work. According to this approach, trust is characterized as a ‘leap of faith’ and as
‘risk-taking’ to enable cooperation in a game in which defection is preferred over
cooperation (Brennan 1997; Deutch 1958). It was argued that trust through communi-
cation is possible to achieve a particular end even under the structural constraints
which promote mistrust (Wallace and Rothaus 1969). Later, Andrew Kydd theorized
trust as ‘the belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s
own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s
own cooperation to returning it’ (2005, 6). In this study, this type of trust is called
rationalist trust. In world politics, rationalist trust, as its conceptualization suggests,
is built between states. Trust, according to this understanding, is a tool which enables
cooperation between states of which interests are defined in relation to the cooperative
relationship. In this understanding, trust has no normative dimension, it just has
instrumental value.
Rationalist trust can be studied as an element, among many, of the cooperative
relationships between states in world politics, such as the EMP. At the same time, it
raises questions about the political agendas of states involved in the cooperation and
what their values and interests are. The political agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean
cooperation is dominated by the construction of order in the Mediterranean region, as
explicitly stated in many EMP documents. Order and stability have become shared
norms manifested in common institutions, as the political ideas and practices which
might disturb the status quo and risk the cooperation have, by and large, been over-
looked and, to a certain extent, marginalized. Differently put, the security rationality
of trust in the Euro-Med cooperation is defined in terms of the norm of order, derived
from the political agendas of the pro-status quo states.
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460  A. Bilgic 
If states adopt ‘order’ as a norm of their security rationality, the underlying secu-
rity thinking of Kyddian trust between pro-status quo actors can be studied through
the perspective provided by Hedley Bull. Security rationalities are always dominated
by particular norms and values which prioritize particular ends such as national self-
interest, international order, or global justice. Bull put ‘order’ at the heart of security
thinking as the principal norm of security. States can develop shared norms and values
with the objective of building order in inter-state relationships (Bull 1977, 13; Buzan
2001; Wheeler 1992).
International order, defined by Bull, refers to ‘a pattern or disposition of interna-
tional activity that sustains the goals of the society of states’ (Bull 1977, 16). If the
goal of the society of states is to protect stability, as in the EMP, international order
based on shared norms, values, and interests can enable cooperative relationships to
that end. Therefore, the construction and protection of international order itself
becomes the main security interest of states. Cooperation between states of which
main interest is to build and protect order is enabled by trust in the Kyddian sense. As
a result of the cooperation enabled by rationalist trust, states in international society
work for the construction of order through shared norms and values manifested in
common institutions.3 In other words, security defined in terms of order is realized by
trust-building between pro-status quo states. This leads to the expense of ideas and
practices which might disturb order, such as in the case of the EMP, the invention of
channels for active civil society participation to the decision-making.
As practices which might destabilize the existing order constructed by states can
be abandoned, alternative actors and their ideas might be overlooked because they risk
order. For example, in relation to the promotion of individual rights, Bull (1977, 84)
stated that the promotion of human rights can ‘lead to disorder in international rela-
tions, or even breakdown of international society itself’. Through this argument, Bull
stressed that order and stability are the norms of the international system. Bull was not
against the promotion of human rights (1999, 220). Rather, for him, the rights of indi-
viduals should be promoted within the framework of the nation-state system without
disturbing order. However, this study problematizes the unconditional prioritization of
order as security because order does not necessarily produce security for individuals.
Cooperation in the EMP based on rationalist trust is in the interests of pro-status quo
states, not of individuals whose security depends on transforming the existing order.
What follows is the discussion of an alternative understanding of trust in world poli-
tics with ‘security as emancipation rationality’.
2.2. Cosmopolitan trust for transformation
In the scholarly literature, it is often argued that trust is possible only within the limited
boundaries of political communities where individuals share communitarian values
(Fukuyama 1995; Soraka, Banting, and Johnston 2002). Uslaner challenges this
perspective by metaphorically arguing that ‘trust solves bigger problems than getting
people to hang out with people like themselves. It connects us to people with whom
we don’t hang out’ (2002, 2, emphasis in original). Trust-building at the cosmopolitan
level transcends local parochialisms, cultural-, religious-, and national-divisive lines,
and short-term rational egoism. Cosmopolitan, or universal, trust means ‘forging bonds
of equal strength with all of humanity, not just with kith and kin’ (Crepaz 2007, 116).
Cosmopolitan trust is the belief that individuals will protect and promote each others’
rights and freedoms. Being one of the fundamental ideas and practices for change in
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 461
world politics, cosmopolitan trust has a political objective which is to connect individ-
uals in the global community of humankind. Cosmopolitan trust has both normative
and non-normative (read: interest) dimensions. While there is a powerful belief that
individuals will do the right by promoting others’ freedoms, cosmopolitan trust works
for certain interests. Interests promoted through the political relationships enabled by
cosmopolitan trust are those of individuals. The core security interest of individuals is
the protection of human freedoms, according to emancipatory security theory.
Security, as emancipation rationality, aims at problematizing oppressive political,
economic, and social structures with the perspective of transforming them (Devetak
1995, 156). The security rationality based on order, which constitutes Bull’s perspective,
understands security as an instrument which serves the interests of dominant political
actors within the existing structures. One of its alternatives is security as emancipation.
Emancipation is ‘the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying
out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others’ (Booth
2007, 112). Security as emancipation varies, depending on the political context and the
characteristics of insecurities that individuals are subjected to. However, the transcen-
dental idea of emancipation is to increase the available choices. As Bilgin argues, ‘crit-
ical approaches to security … aim to raise peoples’ awareness of their choices – those
that were made in the past and those that are available at present’ (2005, 48). It aims
to develop ideas which might contribute to constructing emancipatory structures (polit-
ical, social, and economic) which ensure extensive freedom of choice for individuals.
The central question of ‘security as emancipation’ rationality is: for whom do
security policies work? Security as order, as in the EMP cooperation, may reinforce
the authoritarian regimes in North African countries which limit the freedom of choice
for individuals. It replicates the status quo. In contrast, security as emancipation chal-
lenges the existing oppressive structures with the perspective of constructing emanci-
patory ones. It operates on the basis of the basic principle of cosmopolitan justice:
each individual is entitled to enjoy extensive freedom of choice without violating
others’ freedoms.4
The question is how cosmopolitan trust can be generated and put into practice.
Cosmopolitan trust, like any other type of trust, cannot be demanded by the trustee,
but should be offered by the trusting party (Saligman 2000, 20). Decision-makers in
the EU can offer cosmopolitan trust to North African individuals, if the former adopts
two ideational moves. First, actors should adopt emancipation as the norm of security
rationality in order to facilitate cosmopolitan justice, which can be in the interest of
European security. Cosmopolitan trust can be generated by actors who conceive
cosmopolitan justice as their security interest based on the idea that ‘the violation of
individual rights in one place is felt everywhere’. Emancipation is built upon this prin-
ciple. Booth argues that emancipation is a process that can be operationalized only if
the security of individuals, which means increasing the number of choices for them,
is conceived interdependently (2005). In other words, in the case of the EMP, the
security of EU citizens depends on that of North African states’ citizens and vice
versa. If the norm of order is replaced by the norm of emancipation in security think-
ing, the violation of cosmopolitan justice in North Africa can be understood as a
concern of European security by EU decision-makers. The practical implication of
this thinking was adopted by the Commission of the European Communities: 
Most Mediterranean countries are facing political instability, rapid population growth,
large movement of population and high unemployment. These problems, especially in
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462  A. Bilgic 
the case of the Maghreb countries, are also our problems – such is their influence on the
region’s security and the potential migratory pressure on the Community. (1992)
Cosmopolitan trust toward individuals can be generated if decision-makers adopt the
security rationality favored above by the commission. This factor can be identified as
the interest dimension of cosmopolitan trust, although the normative dimension – indi-
viduals promoting each others’ rights and freedoms – is equally crucial. This is the
first ideational condition of cosmopolitan trust: changing the norm of security ratio-
nality. As will be discussed below, the positive indicators in parallel with emancipa-
tion are emerging in some elements of EU’s policies in North Africa.
There can be many reasons which hinder the generation of cosmopolitan trust. Ratio-
nal egoism, reluctance to take risks, and short-termism can be identified as a few of them.
However, this study focuses on fear (more specifically, fear of uncertainty) as an obstacle
to the generation of cosmopolitan trust. The centrality of fear in the conception of world
politics has attracted many students of IR to thinking about the dynamics and effects of
this ‘primordial feeling’ (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Blits 1989; Huysmans 2006;
O’Driscoll 2007; Weber 2006). Fear in world politics does stem not only from the ability
of others to inflict harm on actors; it can also be thought of in relation to uncertainty. This
is ‘Hobbesian fear’, as briefly mentioned above. According to Hoffman (2004),
Hobbesian political philosophy is underlined by a ‘fear of the unknown’. Limited knowl-
edge generates uncertainty in actors’ minds about how to interpret and respond to inse-
curities. Under the fear of uncertainty, actors may choose to employ less risky policies
in order to reduce this fear. For example, as will be discussed below, the EU has refrained
from a more effective democratization agenda in North Africa due to the unforeseeable
destabilizing effects of democratization. In other words, authoritarian governments are
‘safer’ for the EU. In short, cosmopolitan trust can be generated if the fear of unknown
is transcended. This is the second ideational condition of cosmopolitan trust.
If the decision-makers adopt these two ideational moves, political relationships,
enabled by cosmopolitan trust, can be generated. Cosmopolitan trust works in political
relationships as follows: if decision-makers offer cosmopolitan trust to individuals,
they develop and promote policies which can ensure individuals’ rights and freedoms.
Decision-makers will encourage civil society actors to join the decision-making and
shaping structures. In the EMP, EU decision-makers can adopt policies which aim to
facilitate political reforms in other states for more individual freedoms. Cosmopolitan
trust of EU decision-makers toward North African individuals means that the EU
recognizes the agency of these individuals in politics through North African civil soci-
ety organizations. Policies, enabled by cosmopolitan trust, which empower these orga-
nizations can challenge authoritarian regimes, and therefore, result in political reforms.
3. The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: replication of the status quo and the 
potential for emancipation
3.1. The EU’s competing security rationalities in North Africa
The deteriorating political and economic conditions in North Africa, since the late
1980s, were perceived as a security threat by the EU in the post-Maastricht era
(Calabrase 1997, 89–90). The nature of the new challenges stemming from the southern
neighborhood was not only military, but also political, economic, and social. These
new threats included ‘hard’ security issues, including the proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean region, and also ‘soft’ security issues, such as
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 463
economic instability, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and irregular migration.5 In
1992, the Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities (1992)
warned the European decision-makers that ‘the signs are already apparent in environ-
mental deterioration, social and political unrest and the existing conflicts around the
world. But they could reach unimaginable proportions’. Possible effects of instability
in the Mediterranean region on security in the EU constituted the primary concern of
the EU decision-makers. The main problem the EU faces is how to deal with instability.
The primary concern of the EU was and is the ‘domino effect’, in the words of
Manuel Marin, former commissioner of economic external relations with southern
Mediterranean countries (quoted in Willis 1996, 20). The “domino effect” in this
particular context basically means that ‘the South poses a threat to the North, primarily
in its capacity of exporting “chaos” and “instability” to the North’ (Lia 1999, 32). In
order to prevent the domino effect, the EU and other actors, including NATO, initiated
the confidence-building measures (CBMs). Within the EMP framework, the CBMs
aimed at ‘the creation of conditions that justify a higher degree of trust and confidence
that enhance the knowledge on actions and intentions of a rival’ (Brauch 2000, 30).
The CBMs focused on the military aspect.
However, it is widely argued that insecurities in the Mediterranean region are
complex, interdependent, and trans-national. A security initiative should address this
complexity and focus especially on non-military security problems, as the EU’s threat
perception has been increasingly dominated by ‘soft’ security issues (Spencer 1997,
24). To that aim, given the failure of the CBMs, the EU policies shifted from CBMs
to partnership-building measures (PBMs) (Marquina 2000, 73). The PBMs cover an
area from economy to societal dialog, from common anti-terrorism measures to the
creation of free trade zone. In other words, the PBMs are a means to an end: the
creation of a Euro-Mediterranean political structure, which is not threatening the EU
in neither military nor non-military terms. The EU initiated the Barcelona Process in
1995 as a stabilizing security strategy through PBMs which refer to ‘any kind of
measure geared to enhance mutual knowledge and mutual trust in every possible field,
so that further types of exchanges and cooperation are facilitated’ (Aliboni 1998, 7).
In other words, they are important trust-building tools.
However, from the beginning, EU policies in North Africa have suffered from a
problem called the ‘joint stability trap’. According to the ‘joint stability trap’, the EU
is trapped between promoting political reforms in North Africa and preserving order
(Huber 2004). As will be discussed below, uncertain consequences of democratization
in North Africa, such as empowering the Islamists, have prevented the EU from
embarking on a comprehensive political reform process. Another dimension of this
dilemma is the dependence of the EU on North African regimes, particularly in the
area of irregular immigration control and energy flow from North Africa to Europe. A
tougher stance on human rights violations and democratic reforms in North Africa
may result in losing the cooperation of pro-EU regimes. Therefore, the EU has miti-
gated this dilemma by making a choice in favor of order, rather than transformation
and reform, although political reforms for more democracy in North African countries
have been frequently mentioned in the EMP documents.
There are clearly contradictory perspectives in the EU’s Mediterranean policies.
As will be discussed below, the EU’s security policies in North Africa are character-
ized by two types of security rationality, rather than a dichotomy between interests and
norms. Two security rationalities motivate two types of political relationships: one is
enabled by rationalist trust and the other by cosmopolitan trust.
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464  A. Bilgic 
3.2. The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation through rationalist trust
The EU and its North African partners have been able to develop rationalist trust as
the basis of their cooperation. This type of trust is a consequence of a rational calcu-
lation to achieve certain interests. The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has served the
security interests of the EU and North African authoritarian regimes, as defined in
terms of order as the norm of security thinking. However, this cooperation based on
rationalist trust has been complicit with the failure of democracy promotion and the
marginalization of civil society actors in favor of authoritarian North African regimes.
3.2.1. The failure of democracy promotion
As discussed earlier, the main threat perception of the EU in relation to its neighbor-
hood is the ‘domino effect’. In particular, the Southern European countries’ concerns
‘of a perceived threat to the fabric of societies unaccustomed to large scale immigra-
tion and, more broadly, fear of the spill over or milieu effects of Islamic radicalism
and conflict in the Muslim south’ (Lesser 1995, 24). While the main European interest
is to keep the region stable, democratization becomes less a goal in itself than a pres-
ervation of order (Jünemann 2004, 7). Contrary to the EU’s discourse in favor of
democratization and political reforms in North Africa, security as order has been
enabled by rationalist trust between partners whose cooperation prevents the destabi-
lizing effects of democratization.
It can be argued that democracy is a recurrent theme in the Euro-Mediterranean
conferences, official documents, and financial policies. Although democracy and
respect for human rights were identified as the foundation stones of the first basket in
the Barcelona Document, the EU’s democracy promotion policies have seldom gone
beyond mere rhetoric. For example, in the ‘Valencia Action Plan’ (Euro-Mediterranean
Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs 2002), no specific policies were adopted
for democracy promotion in North Africa. In spite of the commission’s communication
which focused on democracy promotion in the European neighborhood (Commission
of the European Communities 2003), in the 2004 Dublin Council, the partners simply
‘reaffirmed’ that the bases of the EMP are democracy and respect for human rights.
In the European Neighborhood Policy, which was initiated in 2004 as a complementary
political process in the EU’s northern and southern neighborhood, democracy promo-
tion and respect for human rights have achieved a greater political profile, especially
through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans signed by the partners.
However, the non-democratic situation in the southern Mediterranean countries,
which is highly problematic, has not been challenged effectively by the EU. In 2008, the
Freedom House Report identified the partners of the EU in the Maghreb as ‘not free’,
with the exception of Morocco, which is ‘partly free’ (Freedom House 2008). The
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2008 Report criticized North African countries on the
basis that these countries ‘use the threat of terrorism’, have ‘ill treatment of prisoners’
and engage in ‘harassment of human rights defenders’ (HRW 2008). However, ‘the EU
has not attached any political conditionality to the aid, trade or financial relations’
(Stavridis and Hutchence 2003, 71). This is because of adopting a pro-active policy as
a democracy promoter for the EU risks’ stability in the region (Chourou 2003, 35).
The inability of the EU to introduce conditionality in the EMP and the ENP does
not mean that the EU has no democracy promotion agenda, as will be discussed below.
The ENP has, indeed, been structured on the basis of democracy and human rights
promotion, although, according to the research conducted by Maier and
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 465
Schimmelfenning (2007), it has had very limited impact on the region. The primary
rationality of the cooperation renders democracy promotion secondary to security as
order because democratization can be a source of instability in the region, and there-
fore, of insecurity for the EU (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). For the EU, ‘regime stabil-
ity in the target countries [of the EMP] is the real priority because these regimes can
guarantee no upset in the international status quo, which would threaten EU interests
in the area’ (Cavatorta et al. 2008, 365). On the basis of this position, the North African
regimes ‘have sought consistently to turn the EU reform initiative into one focused on
stability and consolidation’ (Aliboni 2004). Therefore, the Euro-Mediterranean polit-
ical structure is constructed and reconstructed through cooperation based on rationalist
trust between European and North African states. Both sides have gains from order.
Actors and agents who can upset order in the region have been marginalized.
3.2.2. The marginalization of North African civil society in the EMP
The integration of civil society into the structures of the EMP was a novel initiative.
Its goal was to ensure the participation of peoples, both by encouraging democratiza-
tion in the south and by reinforcing a ‘sense of ownership’ across the Mediterranean.
In other words, civil society was granted a ‘pivotal role’ in the framework of PBMs
where the bottom-up approach is the principle (Panebianco 2003, 11). However,
uncertainty of the EU about the destabilizing effects of democratization, including
social unrest and the rise of Islamist movements, has resulted in the appeasement of
the authoritarian governments of which cooperation is essential for European security.
Concessions to partners began with the ‘Barcelona Declaration’ (Euro-
Mediterranean Conference 1995), which stated that only those civil society actors
who operate ‘within the framework of national laws’ are granted participation.
However, what Northern Mediterranean partners disregard is the fact that national
laws in the south do not constitute a firm ground for the freedom of association,
which is the basic principle to have independent civil society movements. From
Morocco to Lebanon, even legally constituted civil society organizations have been
subjected to continuous harassment from the police and other governmental agencies
(EMHRN 2007). The oppression of civil society movements has sometimes
amounted to arbitrary detentions, imprisonment, even disappearances.6 The examples
of harassment to all types of civil society movements can be detailed (see Gunert
2004). None of these issues have so far had place in the EMP.
Another problem which hinders active participation of civil society in the Euro-
Med cooperation is governmental control over financial aid to civil society through
Mediterranean Economic Development Area (MEDA) I, MEDA II, and the European
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Europe’s Mediterranean partners,
which are regimes with authoritarian tendencies, have control over the ‘democracy
funds’, although from time to time the EU challenges this situation, as will be
discussed below. This has created serious obstacles for the flourishing of civil society
in North Africa because ‘when regimes maintain direct or indirect control over large
capital inflows [including European Investment Bank’s credits] during structural
adjustment, they appear capable of resisting demands for a truly transformative polit-
ical pluralism’ (Dillman 2002, 82).
The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), which is the largest
forum of NGOs in the area receiving considerable ‘democracy fund’ itself, severely
criticizes governmental control over funding civil society through vetoing the fund.
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One of the most well-known and interesting events was the imprisonment of Hafez
Abu Saadeh, General Secretary of the Egyptian Organization of the Human Rights,
who was accused of accepting EU funds without official permission (International
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 2001, 14). In 2000, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a
professor of sociology, the founder of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Stud-
ies and the Secretary General of the Egyptian Independent Commission for Electoral
Review, was arrested on the basis of a similar allegation. Professor Ibrahim was
sentenced to two-year long imprisonment for ‘tarnishing Egypt’ in 2008.7
The ambivalence of the EU toward the problems faced by the North African civil
society activists and movements has been criticized by the commission. In ‘Reinvig-
orating the Barcelona Process’ (Commission of the European Communities 2000), the
commission calls for invoking the conditionality clause for the MEDA aid. It repeats
the same clause while defining the role of the EU in the promotion of democracy and
human rights in third countries (Commission of the European Communities 2001).
However, conditionality has not been attached to financial aid. Opposition to this situ-
ation, finally, came out in the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum in Marseilles (2008),
which has been the most critical civil forum to the EMP: ‘civil society is subject to
unacceptable mistrust and their members to intolerable suppression. Moreover, the
participation of civil society representatives in the institutions of the Partnership is
now questioned’.
The last criticism, the questioning of civil society in the EMP by state authorities,
deserves attention. When it was first formed in 1995, the Euro-Med Civil Forum
consisted of two structures. The first forum was funded by the commission; the second
one was completely independent, including a broad range of civil society actors across
the Mediterranean. However, the independent forum was simply ignored by the minis-
ters and was never summoned again, while the first civil forum, which is too close to
be a ‘watchdog’, was kept as the Euro-Med Civil Forum (Jünemann 2003). Even the
commission, which is the funding body of the civil forum, stopped sending represen-
tatives to the discussions taking place within the forum in 2001, which furthered the
marginalization of civil society (Reinhardt 2002). In 2004, the clause of ‘wide circle
of civil society participation’ was removed from the Euro-Med ministerial confer-
ences’ conclusions, as attention shifted away from civil society participation to areas
of immigration and intercultural dialog (Malmvig 2007, 82). The Euro-Mediterranean
Civil Forum in Luxembourg (2005) offered a plan for ‘real involvement of civil soci-
ety’, but it has been ignored so far. The Euro-Med cooperation based on rationalist
trust has excluded a vital element of change in world politics for the sake of security
as order.
3.3. The emancipatory potential in the EMP: cosmopolitan trust for security
If rationalist trust characterizes the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, does it mean that
cosmopolitan trust of EU decision-makers toward North African individuals
oppressed by political, economic, and social structures in North Africa is unlikely and
utopian? Cosmopolitan trust toward individuals reveals the emancipatory potential in
the EMP and the ENP by prioritizing alternative political agendas and practices
embedded in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. The operationalization of cosmo-
politan trust depends on replacing order with emancipation as the norm of security
rationality and transcending fear of unknown consequences of political reforms.
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3.3.1. Changing the norm of EU security thinking
EU policies are often explained by the dichotomy between normative/norms and ratio-
nalist/interests policies, particularly in the Euro-Mediterranean context (Smith 2008;
Stavridis and Hutchence 2003). While the pro-democracy and human rights policies
of the EU are identified by the normative power of EU, the cooperation with authori-
tarian states in North Africa is explained though the realist EU which acts in accor-
dance with its interests. However, this dichotomy is misleading. One of the objectives
of this study is to show that the EU’s policies in the Mediterranean region are charac-
terized by two security rationalities, each of which is derived from particular norms
and interests. The dichotomy is not between normative and rationalist or between
norms and interests, but between two alternative security rationalities underlined by
two different norms. If this is the case, what is the reason of the dichotomy between
normative and rational arguments?
The dichotomy between normative and rational approaches results from equating
rationalism with materialism. In contrast, beliefs and desires are essential components
of rationality, along with material interests (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 58–9). Different
ideas, beliefs, and desires constitute alternative rationalities. Richard Youngs, one of
the few scholars in EU studies problematizing the normative/rationalist divide, argues
that ‘the way in which certain norms have been conceived and incorporated into exter-
nal policy reveals a certain security-predicated rationalism’ (2004, 421). The norm of
emancipation, such as order, can underlie security thinking. In practice, this principle
means that cosmopolitan justice can constitute a security interest of EU if security as
emancipation rationality is prioritized by the EU decision-makers. As a result, cosmo-
politan trust toward North African individuals can be generated.
Cosmopolitan trust has been the foundation of certain policies because security as
emancipation rationality has never been abandoned in the EMP; however it has been
highly neglected. Since the launch of the Barcelona Process of 1995, which accepted
democracy and human rights as the foundations of the EMP, democracy and human
rights promotion have always had space in the EMP documents, sometimes with
tangible results. Association agreements with Morocco included democracy and
human rights clauses which resulted in the funding of 48 civil society projects in
Morocco (Haddadi 2004, 73–89). Because of the violation of democratic norms and
human rights, the initiation and adoption of the association agreement with Algeria
was suspended between 1997 and 2002. Tunisian governments’ objections could not
prevent the financial aid of the EU to the most powerful Tunisian civil society orga-
nization (Youngs 2003, 421–3).
The ENP has provided a new legal and political framework for democratization
and the protection of human rights in North Africa. The commission’s annual reports
about the political situation in North African states are now integrated into the ENP
decision-shaping; the action plans in the ENP are not only more detailed and
concrete about democracy promotion, but also more specific about the compliance of
political practices in North African states with the UN and European conventions
(Maier and Schimmelfenning 2007, 43). The EU has never overlooked the impor-
tance of the transformation of political structures for security in the EU. These devel-
opments make cosmopolitan trust a practical idea, rather than simply wishful
thinking. However, security as order has also prevailed, along with rationalist trust in
the EMP cooperation. One of the most important reasons for this is the fear of
uncertainty.
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3.3.2. Transcending the EU’s fear of uncertainty in the southern neighborhood
In the ‘joint stability trap’, the EU has often chosen stability because the future conse-
quences of democracy promotion are uncertain. This uncertainty can be analyzed
through the words of Pervin (1997, 295) who argued that in relation to the Arab–Israel
peace process, democratization has bestowed greater power to the movements which
are opposed to peace. As discussed above, one of the EU’s main concerns is religious
fundamentalism and terrorism in North Africa. Democratization may weaken pro-
European authoritarian governments in favor of Islamist movements. This is a risk
that the EU has not taken so far. Rationalist trust in the EMP cooperation has by and
large worked for these regimes. By focusing on this threat, North African regimes
have oppressed various opposition movements without effective criticism or political
sanction by the EU (Lia 1999, 50).
Fear of uncertainty is one of the most important challenges for building cosmopol-
itan trust which may lead to the transformation of existing political, economic, and
social structures. How can the EU transcend its fears about the uncertain consequences
of democratization? Rustow defines democracy as a stalemate in the ongoing conflict
of opposing groups which see democracy as a condition of surviving together:
‘democratization is the by-product of a stalemate situation of an inconclusive struggle,
in which the main protagonists may seek democracy to end the struggle’ (quoted in
Lia 1999, 50). In other words, democracy is not the product of the best democrats.
Through the interaction of opposing sides, it is learnt whether the parties of interaction
are democratic or not. Security as order rationality damages the democratization
process in North Africa not only because it overlooks reforms, but also because it
weakens the opposition movements, Islamist or non-Islamist, in favor of authoritarian
governments. However, in this understanding, what is highly neglected by EU deci-
sion-makers is the fact that authoritarianism had fed into radicalization in many North
African countries (Storm 2009).
Fears about democratization can be dealt with through a more effective inclusion
of North African civil society in the EMP as addressees of cosmopolitan trust by the
EU. Firstly, the inclusion of civil society should ensure wider participation of social
groups. In other words, civil society activities should cover more than ‘museums
without borders’, which restrict civil society activities to the elite level. The EMP
cooperation has established innovative mechanisms, such as the Euro-Med heritage,
the Euro-Med youth, and the Euro-Med audiovisual, in which its actors from northern
and southern Mediterranean can interact. However, it is questionable to what extent
this elite-level civil society participation can generate political reforms. Active civil
society participation is a necessary condition of bottom-up democratization.
Secondly, in order to generate wider civil society participation, governmental
control over financial aid should be lessened by reestablishing organic links between
North African civil society organizations and the commission. This was the general
practice at the beginning of the EMP. It should be reinstituted in order to prevent
unfortunate cases, such as Professor Ibrahim’s, described earlier. Meanwhile, the EU
should introduce conditionality to reform civil society legislation in North African
countries in accordance with the European-level freedom of association law.
Thirdly, a special ‘Barcelona Visa’ which was previously proposed by the Euro-
pean Parliament should be issued to civil society actors (Reinhardt 2002). ‘Museums
without borders’ should be supported by ‘civil society without borders’. The freedom
of movement for North African civil society can contribute to establishing stronger
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links with European civil society actors. This can create the opportunity to share
experiences.
4. Conclusion
Stemming from the above, the following conclusions can be obtained. Firstly, trust is
central in world politics where actors aim to build security. However, in order to
understand the patterns of trust, different security rationalities should be discussed as
underlying elements of trust-building: what types of norms dominate the security
thinking? This article specifically conceptualized two types of trust with two types of
security rationality. Rationalist trust is the belief of an actor that others will prefer
returning its cooperation rather than exploiting it. It operates at the state level in inter-
national society in order to achieve particular ends defined in accordance with security
interests of states. If states define security in terms of protecting order, as theorized by
Bull, rationalist trust becomes a tool for the protection of the status quo, rather than
for change and transformation which can increase security for individuals and social
groups. Moreover, inter-state trust might be a source of insecurity for individuals, as
discussed in the case of the EMP.
In contrast, cosmopolitan trust exists when state and non-state actors believe that
individuals as the members of global community of humankind protect and promote
each others’ rights and freedoms. It is built toward individuals, although it operates at
both state and non-state level. Through the concept of cosmopolitan trust, trust-
building can be a transformative force in world politics by producing security for a
wider group of individuals, since the underlying rationality of cosmopolitan trust is
‘security as emancipation’. Cosmopolitan trust toward individuals oppressed by polit-
ical structures becomes a political force that reveals ideas and practices which can
emancipate individuals from oppression.
Secondly, both rationalist and cosmopolitan trusts characterize political relation-
ships in the EMP depending on conflictive security interests and values. The EU has
defined instability as a source of insecurity in North Africa. The main question the EU
faces is how to deal with instability: through protecting the status quo or through
generating reforms challenging authoritarianism in North Africa. The EU’s policies
suffer from this tension. The EU has dominantly dealt with instability in North Africa
by keeping order in the region through cooperation with authoritarian regimes. Order
has been understood as a source of security by the EU. This is why it has improved
cooperative relationships with these regimes, neglecting an effective democratization
agenda in the EMP and integrating civil society to the EMP decision-shaping and
-making. This cooperative relationship is enabled by rationalist trust to achieve a
particular end: protecting the status quo as a source of stability.
One of the findings of this analysis is that policies of security aiming to keep order
do not necessarily generate security for individuals in North Africa. However, this
does not reflect the whole picture. The EU has also developed a thinking which
conceives authoritarianism as a source of instability. By making ideals as security
interests and transcending the fear of the unknown consequences of political reforms,
policies which strengthen civil society and challenge authoritarian regimes in North
Africa have recently been adopted. This relationship is based on cosmopolitan trust of
the EU toward individuals who are oppressed by authoritarian regimes. Freeing indi-
viduals from oppression, which constitutes emancipation, is also understood by the
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EU as security. The tension between two types of security rationalities has resulted in
two types of relationships based on two types of trust.
Notes
1. The North African countries that the article refers to are Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and
Egypt. The reports of Freedom House and Human Right Watch were used to define these
countries as authoritarian and ‘not free’ with Morocco being ‘partly free.’ Libya is
excluded from the analysis because it is not a member of the EMP.
2. This argument was developed through the meetings of the David Davies Memorial Institute,
‘Trust in World Politics?’ Interdisciplinary Discussion Group, Aberystwyth University.
3. Booth and Wheeler define order as ‘a situation in which the goals of the actors are predict-
ably maintained through shared norms and values manifested in common institutions’. See
Booth and Wheeler (2008, 15–6).
4. This is the Kantian version of cosmopolitan justice, see Cavallar (1999).
5. For the discussion of EU’s threat perception in the Mediterranean region, see Blunden
(1994), Pace (2007), and Winrow (2008).
6. For the oppression in Tunisia, for example, see Open Letter to Chris Patten with regard to
the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement by Amnesty International, Avocats Sans Fron-
tiers, EMHR, FIDH, Human Rights Watch, Reporters without Borders (2001). Available
at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/tn2904a.pdf.
7. Interview with Professor Ibrahim, see http://www.democratiya.com/interview.asp?
issueid=8.
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